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THE MYTH OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES IN
CORPORATE REORGANIZATION CASES
Carlos j Cuevas*
I. INTRODUCTION
In an ongoing debate concerning the desirability of Chapter 11,1
some commentators have advocated the repeal of Chapter 11,2 others
* Scholar-in-Residence, St. John's University School of Law and Counsel to the
law firm of Rosenberg, Musso & Weiner, LLP. Thanks to Raymond Patella, Esq. and
Theodore Kaplan, Esq. who provided important assistance in the development of this
paper. I would also like to express my appreciation to Dean Rudolph Hasl and
Professor Robert Zinman for their support of this project. Copyright 1997 Carlos J.
Cuevas.
1 See, e.g., THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LoGIC AND Limrrs OF BANKRuPTcy LAw
(1986); Barry E. Adler, Financial and Political Theories of American Corporate Bankruptcy,
45 STAN. L. RiEv. 311 (1993); Douglas G. Baird, The Uneasy Casefor Corporate Reorganiza-
tions, 15J. LE-GAL SrUD. 127 (1986); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, A New Approach to Corporate
Reorganizations, 101 HARv. L. REv. 775 (1988); Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig,
The Untenable Case for Chapter 11, 101 YALE L.J. 1043 (1992); Thomas H. Jackson &
Robert E. Scott, On the Nature of Bankruptcy: An Essay on Bankruptcy Sharing and the
Creditors'Bargain, 75 VA. L. REv. 155 (1989); Edith H.Jones, Chapter 11: A Death Penalty
for Debtor and Creditor Interests, 77 CoR i.L L. REv. 1088 (1992); Donald R. Korobkin,
Rehabilitating Values: Ajurisprudence of Bankruptcy, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 717 (1991); Lynn
M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Corporate Governance in the Bankruptcy Reorganiza-
tion of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 669 (1993); RonaldJ. Mann,
Bankruptcy and the Entitlements of the Government: Whose Money Is It Anyway ., 70 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 993 (1995); Robert K. Rasmussen, Debtor's Choice: A Menu Approach to Corporate
Bankruptcy, 71 TEx. L. Rv. 51 (1992); MarkJ. Roe, Bankruptcy and Debt: A New Model
for Corporate Reorganization, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 527 (1983); Elizabeth Warren, The Un-
tenable Case for Repeal of Chapter 11, 102 YALE L.J. 437 (1992) [hereinafter Warren,
Chapter 11]; Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. Cm. L. REv. 775 (1987) [here-
inafter Warren, Bankruptcy Policy].
2 See Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 1 (advocating the repeal of Chapter 11
and the creation of a "contingent equity"). Professor Adler has advocated the repeal
of Chapter 11, and substitution of a "Chameleon Equity." Professor Adler has stated:
While no insolvency process is completely costless, a better solution to
the problem of expensive insolvency exists. This solution, "Chameleon Eq-
uity," would not require an auction or a separate postinsolvency capital struc-
ture. Rather, it would give a firm the flexibility to issue a single set of
unbundled residual and fixed obligations. A Chameleon Equity firm would
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have recommended that Chapter 11 be modified, 3 and others have
staunchly defended the present Chapter 11 system. 4 Corporate reor-
ganization scholarship has recently focused on the effectiveness of
Chapter 11; the empirical evidence, as reflected in this scholarship,
shows that Chapter 11 has significant difficulties which are detrimen-
tal to creditors.5
In 1994 Congress enacted various important amendments to the
Bankruptcy Code (the "Code"); 6 however, these amendments only im-
plemented incremental modifications to Chapter 11. The 1994
amendments to the Code granted secured creditors greater rights and
remedies in corporate reorganizations. 7 Code § 362(d) provides a se-
closely resemble a traditional firm, except that fixed-obligation Chameleon
Equity holders would replace creditors. Such a Chameleon Equity holder
would possess the same right as a creditor to set payments from the firm, but
it would not be permitted to collect individually on an obligation in default.
Instead, if the firm defaulted and remained in default on a fixed Chameleon
Equity claim, the holder would gain a portion of the firm's residual claim
and of voting control over the firm. Unpaid Chameleon Equity holders
could then collectively decide to continue or to liquidate the firm, which
would remain subject to any fixed claim not in default. In essence, a Chame-
leon Equity firm would retain the benefits of fixed obligations but would
bear neither the costs that accompany a race to assets nor, in many in-
stances, the costs of reintroducing fixed claims after insolvency.
Adler, supra note 1, at 323-24. Others have advocated replacing Chapter 11 with an
auction of the debtor. SeeJACKSON, supra note 1, at 209-24; Baird, supra note 1.
3 See, e.g., Bebchuk, supra note 1; Roe, supra note 1.
4 See, e.g., Lynn M. LoPucki, Strange Visions in a Strange World: A Reply to Professors
Bradley and Rosenzweig, 91 MICH. L. REV. 79 (1992); Warren, Chapter 11, supra note 1;
Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, supra note 1; William C. Whitford, What's Right About Chapter
11, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1379 (1994).
5 For a general discussion of the problems with Chapter 11, see generally Brad-
ley & Rosenzweig, supra note 1 and Lynn M. LoPucki, The Trouble with Chapter 11, 1993
Wis. L. REV. 729. For example, it has been estimated that only between 10-12% of all
public and private firms emerge out of Chapter 11 and that only seventeen percent
have a reorganization plan confirmed. See Edward I. Altman, Comment, Evaluating
the Chapter 11 Bankruptty-Reorganization Process, 1993 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 1; see also,
LYNN M. LoPuciu, STRATEGIES FOR CREDITORS IN BANKRuprrc § 9.17 (1985) (illustrat-
ing that Chapter 11 has a poor success rate).
6 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1130 (1994).
7 In 1994 Code § 362(d) was amended, and § 362(d) (3) was added to the Code.
Section 362(d) (3) states:
On request of a party in interest and after notice and a hearing, the court
shall grant relief from the stay provided under subsection (a) of this section,
such as by terminating, annulling, modifying, or conditioning such stay...
(3) with respect to a stay of an act against single asset real estate under
subsection (a), by a creditor whose claim is secured by an interest in
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cured creditor with a potent mechanism for protecting its interest and
enforcing fiduciary duties in corporate reorganization cases. Section
362 (d) permits a secured creditor to obtain relief from the automatic
stay and foreclose on its collateral. This is a powerful inducement to
make Chapter 11 debtors comply with their contractual and fiduciary
duties to secured creditors.
Although much has been made of the significant overhaul which
the 1994 amendments were supposed to accomplish, the amendments
failed to address the plight of an unsecured creditor in a Chapter 11
case. The Code has granted unsecured creditors various remedies to
enforce fiduciary duties in corporate reorganization cases. However,
these remedies fail to achieve the desired results because they are inef-
ficient and the bankruptcy courts are adverse to employing these rem-
edies during the initial phases of a reorganization case. Moreover, the
plight of unsecured creditors in insolvent corporate reorganization
cases is exacerbated because Chapter 11 is premised on the erroneous
notion that a debtor's management should remain in control of the
debtor. Chapter l's failure to provide unsecured creditors with effi-
cacious remedies to enforce fiduciary duties permits management to
exploit Chapter 11 and disregard the interests of the unsecured credi-
tors. The myth of fiduciary duties in corporate reorganizations is a
fundamental issue which goes to the core of whether the current sys-
tem of Chapter 11 is beneficial for unsecured creditors. The inability
of unsecured creditors to enforce fiduciary duties renders corporate
reorganizations inefficient and ineffectual for unsecured creditors be-
cause management usually has no incentive to maximize the distribu-
tion for unsecured creditors.8
such real estate, unless, not later than the date that is 90 days after the
entry of the order for relief (or such later date as the court may deter-
mine for cause by order entered within that 90 day period)-
(A) the debtor has filed a plan or reorganization that has a reason-
able possibility of being confirmed within a reasonable time; or
(B) the debtor has commenced monthly payments to each creditor
whose claim is secured by such real estate (other than a claim se-
cured by ajudgment lien or by an unmatured statutory lien), which
payments are in an amount equal to interest at a current fair mar-
ket rate on the value of the creditor's interest in the real estate.
11 U.S.c § 362(d) (3). Section 362(d) (3) was intended to address the problems
caused by single asset debtors that seek to exploit Chapter 11. In addition, § 362(e)
was amended to provide for more expedited hearings for motions for relief from the
automatic stay. Consequently, the 1994 amendments did address some of the
problems confronting secured creditors in Chapter 11 cases.
8 As the following discussion will reflect, many of the major problems associated
with corporate reorganizations are directly related to the lack of enforcement of fidu-
1998]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
The purpose of this Article is to discuss the plight of unsecured
creditors in insolvent corporate reorganization cases, and to recom-
mend how Chapter 11 should be amended so as to ensure that un-
secured creditors have efficient and efficacious remedies for the
enforcement of fiduciary duties, thereby providing management with
an incentive to manage the estate on behalf of the unsecured credi-
tors. Part II of this Article discusses how unsecured creditors have
ineffective and inefficient remedies to compel the enforcement of fi-
duciary duties. Part III proposes that, at the inception of a reorganiza-
tion case concerning an insolvent debtor, unsecured creditors should
be granted the option of either retaining current management or re-
placing existing management with a Chapter 11 trustee, by a "Vote of
No Confidence". In essence, the Vote of No Confidence is a self-exe-
cuting efficient and effectual means of enforcing fiduciary duties in
insolvent corporate reorganization cases because it reduces transac-
tion costs and permits the unsecured creditors to select a debtor's
management without resorting to expensive and protracted litigation.
In Part IV various rationales are given for adopting the proposed Vote
of No Confidence, including: bankruptcy theory, efficiency, that un-
secured creditors are the true parties-in-interest when a debtor is in-
solvent, and that the Vote of No Confidence will have a salutary
impact on corporate reorganization cases.
II. THE PLIGHT OF UNSECURED CREDITORS IN AN INSOLVENT
CORPORATE REORGANIZATION CASE
A. A Debtor-in-Possession Owes Fiduciary Duties to the Creditors
1. Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Weintraub
In Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Weintraub,9 the
Supreme Court held that, with respect to pre-bankruptcy communica-
tions, a bankruptcy trustee controls the attorney-client privilege for a
debtor-corporation.' 0 In reaching its conclusion, the Court observed
that the commencement of a bankruptcy case causes fundamental
transformations in corporate relationships.' Therefore, a debtor-in-
ciary duties in corporate reorganization cases. The ability to effectively and efficiently
enforce fiduciary duties in corporate reorganization cases will reduce the current ex-
ploitation of Chapter 11 by unscrupulous debtors and lead to a maximization of cred-
itor wealth.
9 471 U.S. 343 (1985).
10 Id. at 358.
11 Justice Marshall wrote:
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possession owes fiduciary duties not only to the equity security hold-
ers, but also to the creditors.12
Weintraub is significant because it established the proposition that
a debtor-in-possession is a fiduciary for the unsecured creditors.' 3
The Court also noted that when a debtor is insolvent the interests of
the shareholders must be subordinated to the interests of the credi-
tors.14 In particular, Chapter 11 can function only if the debtor's
management is capable of exercising its fiduciary duties to the credi-
tors in the same manner as a trustee.
2. Weintraub's Progeny
Many lower federal courts have cited Weintraub for the proposi-
tion that a debtor-in-possession is a fiduciary to its creditors.15 These
Second, respondents do not explain why, out of all management powers,
control over the attorney-client privilege should remain with those elected
by the corporation's shareholders. Perhaps most importantly, respondents'
position ignores the fact that bankruptcy causes fundamental changes in the
nature of corporate relationships. One of the painful facts of bankruptcy is
that the interests of shareholders become subordinated to the interests of
creditors. In cases in which it is clear that the estate is not large enough to
cover any shareholder claims, the trustee's exercise of the corporation's at-
torney-client privilege will benefit only creditors, but there is nothing anom-
alous in this result; rather, it is in keeping with the hierarchy of interests
created by the bankruptcy laws.
Id. at 355.
12 The Court explained:
Respondents also ignore that if a debtor remains in possession-that is, if a
trustee is not appointed-the debtor's directors bear essentially the same
fiduciary obligation to creditors and shareholders as would the trustee for a
debtor out of possession. Indeed, the willingness of courts to leave debtors
in possession "is premised upon an assurance that the officers and managing
employees can be depended upon to carry out the fiduciary responsibilities
of a trustee."
Id. (citations omitted).
13 See Thomas G. Kelch, The Phantom Fiduciary: The Debtor in Possession in Chapter
11, 38 WAYNE L. REv. 1323, 1335 (1992).
14 Weintraub, 471 U.S. at 355.
15 See, e.g., Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Reynolds & Reynolds Co. (In reJKJ Chevrolet,
Inc.), 26 F.3d 481, 485 (4th Cir. 1994); Casco N. Bank, N. Am. v. DN Assocs. (In re
DN Assocs.), 144 B.R. 195, 199 (Bankr. D. Me. 1992), appeal denied, 160 B.R. 20
(Bankr. D. Me. 1993), afj'd, 3 F.3d 512 (1st Cir. 1993); In re Automobile Warranty
Corp., 138 B.R. 72, 80 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1991). One court has made the following
observations concerning fiduciary duties:
One is said to act in a "fiduciary capacity" or to receive money or contract a
debt in a "fiduciary capacity," when the business which he transacts or the
money or property which he handles, is not his own or for his own benefit, but
1998]
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courts have employed Weintraub to develop a common law of fiduciary
duties in bankruptcy.1 6 Some courts relying upon Weintraub have im-
posed liability upon directors, officers, and insiders because of
breaches of fiduciary duties that occurred while these companies were
operated as debtors-in-possession.' 7
3. The Standard of Liability for Breach of Fiduciary Duty
a. Intentional and Willful Conduct
The Supreme Court has not determined the standard of liability
for establishing a breach of fiduciary duty by either a trustee or
debtor-in-possession. Some lower federal courts have held that in or-
der to hold a trustee or debtor-in-possession personally liable for a
breach of fiduciary duty it must be established that the trustee inten-
tionally and willfully breached his or her fiduciary duty.'8 For exam-
ple, in Sherr v. Winkler,'9 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit held that a trustee is not personally liable unless he or
she acts willfully and deliberately in violation of his or her fiduciary
duties.20 The court based its decision on the Supreme Court's deci-
for the benefit of another person, as to whom he stands in a relation imply-
ing and necessitating great confidence and trust on the one part and a high
degree of good faith on the otherpart. The term is not restricted to technical or
express trusts, but includes also such offices or relations as those of an attor-
ney at law, a guardian, executor, or broker, a director of a corporation, and
a public officer.
In re Harp, 166 B.R. 740, 747 n.3 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1993) (quoting BLACK'S LAW Dic-
TIONARY 564 (5th ed. 1979).
16 A debtor's management owes a fiduciary duty to the creditors, and that fiduci-
ary duty requires management to refrain from pursuing courses of action that would
solely benefit management. See In re DN Assocs., 144 B.R. at 199. In the same vein,
debtor's counsel may not be compensated from the estate for representing the inter-
ests of the debtor or the debtor's directors, officers, or shareholders in a manner that
is detrimental to the creditors. See id. A debtor has a fiduciary duty to preserve the
assets of the estate so as to maximize the return for unsecured creditors. See First
Union Nat'l Bank v. Tenn-Fla Partners (In re Tenn-Fla Partners), 170 B.R. 946, 970
(Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1994).
17 See, e.g., Committee of Creditors Holding Unsecured Claims v. Citicorp Ven-
ture Capital, Ltd. (In re Papercraft Corp.) 187 B.R. 486, 498-500 (Bankr. W.D. Pa.
1995); Bernstein v. Donaldson (In re Insulfoams, Inc.), 184 B.R. 694, 703 (Bankr.
W.D. Pa. 1995); In re Harp, 166 B.R. at 746.
18 See, e.g., Yadkin Valley Bank & Trust Co. v. McGee, 819 F.2d 74 (4th Cir. 1987);
Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Weaver, 680 F.2d 451 (6th Cir. 1982); Sherr v. Winkler, 552
F.2d 1367 (10th Cir. 1977); In re Haugen Constr. Serv., Inc., 104 B.R. 233 (Bankr.
D.N.D. 1989).
19 552 F.2d at 1367.
20 Id. at 1375.
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sion in Mosser v. Darrow,21 interpreting Mosser to require intentional
and willful misconduct as a prerequisite for liability for breach of fidu-
ciary duty.22
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Ford Motor Credit Co.
v. Weaver23 has also held that a trustee or debtor-in-possession can be
held personally liable only for an intentional and willful breach of his
or her fiduciary duties. 24 The Sixth Circuit principally relied upon
the Sherr decision, and it concluded that the intentional and willful
standard was the correct standard for imposing liability.25 Ford Motor
Credit is also significant because it held that trustee liability principles
also extended to a debtor-in-possession. 26
The intentional and willful standard imposes significant obstacles
for the enforcement of fiduciary duties. First of all, it is a difficult
standard of proof to satisfy because mere negligence will not suffice.
As a policy matter it is imprudent to have such a high standard for
imposing liability because the standard of liability should encourage
managers and directors of insolvent companies to be more cautious.
Consequently, it is more prudent to impose a lower threshold for im-
posing liability so as to compel debtor's management to act more
21 341 U.S. 267 (1951). In Mosser v. Darrow, the Court ruled that a trustee of a
common law trust could be surcharged for failing to take action when his subordi-
nates engaged in intentional breaches of fiduciary duties by trading in the securities
of the debtor's subsidiaries.
22 The court stated:
Mosser v. Darrow, supra, established the rules that a trustee or receiver in
bankruptcy is (a) not liable, in any manner, for mistake in judgment where
discretion is allowed, (b) liable personally only for acts determined to be will-
ful and deliberate in violation of his duties and (c) liable, in his official ca-
pacity, for acts of negligence.
Sherr, 552 F.2d at 1375.
23 680 F.2d at 451.
24 Id. at 461.
25 The Sixth Circuit stated:
A trustee in bankruptcy may be liable for violations of his fiduciary duties. A
trustee in bankruptcy can be liable in his official capacity or individually. A
bankruptcy trustee is liable in his official capacity for acts of negligence. The
applicable standard is the exercise of due care, diligence and skill both as to
affirmative and negative duties. The measure of care, diligence and skill
required of a trustee is that of "an ordinarily prudent man in the conduct of
his private affairs under similar circumstances and with a similar object in
view." Mistakes in judgment cannot be the basis of a trustee's liability in his
official capacity.... A bankruptcy trustee is liable personally only for acts
willfully and deliberately in violation of his fiduciary duties.
Id. (citations omitted).
26 Id. at 461-62.
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carefully.27 Establishing a lower threshold for imposing liability
should facilitate the enforcement of fiduciary duties, and thus compel
some managers to act more prudently. Equally as important, the
lower threshold of liability should compel managers to act in the un-
secured creditors' best interests and maximize the value of the estate,
thereby deterring officers and directors from making decisions that
will exclusively benefit the equity security holders or themselves.
Litigation as the means of remedying or rectifying breaches of
fiduciary duties is inefficient, especially in the context of an insolvent
corporate reorganization case. In general, litigation is expensive and
time consuming, and an insolvent estate may lack the resources to
prosecute actions for breach of fiduciary duty against debtor's former
management. A trustee might be deterred from commencing litiga-
tion because of the cost of the litigation and the high threshold of
proof. There is also the important issue of whether the estate will be
able to enforce and collect its judgment. If the debtor is a closely-held
corporation, and its principal has also filed for bankruptcy because of
personal guarantees, then the principal might also be insolvent.
Although the judgment might be nondischargeable, the judgment
might be worthless. Under these circumstances, litigation as the prin-
cipal means of enforcing fiduciary duties is an inefficient and ineffec-
tual remedy.
With all due deference, the Tenth and Sixth Circuits miscon-
strued Mosser v. Darrow. The Supreme Court never discussed the issue
of what was the standard for imposing liability on a trustee for breach
of fiduciary duty. Thus, as a matter of law, these courts have misinter-
preted the law, and made the enforcement of fiduciary duties against
a debtor-in-possession more difficult.
b. Negligence
Some lower federal courts have held that a trustee, and thus a
debtor-in-possession, can be held liable for negligent as well as inten-
tional breaches of his or her fiduciary duty to the estate. 28 In In re
27 The filing of a Chapter 11 petition means that the Titanic is in trouble, and the
ship's crew should exercise more caution in Chapter 11 so as to avoid ramming into
another iceberg. The fact that a company has filed for Chapter 11 should dramati-
cally alter the rules of engagement. Management should act with greater prudence,
and its decisions should be held to higher scrutiny.
28 See, e.g., In re Gorski, 766 F.2d 723, 727 (2d Cir. 1985); In re Cochise College
Park, Inc., 703 F.2d 1339, 13357 (9th Cir. 1983); Barrows v. Bezanson (In re Barrows),
171 B.R. 455, 459 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1994); In re Charlestown Home Furnishing, 150
B.R. 226, 227 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1993).
[V€OL. 73:2
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Cochise College Park, Inc.,29 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that
a trustee could be held liable for negligent breaches of fiduciary
duty.30 The court rejected the reasoning employed by the Tenth and
Sixth Circuit Courts of Appeal because it thought that the Tenth Cir-
cuit had misconstrued Mosser v. Darrow.3'
Although the negligence standard is less onerous than the inten-
tional and willful standard, it is still fraught with problems. The prin-
cipal difficulty with the negligence standard is that the only means of
enforcing it is through litigation. As previously discussed, litigation is
an inefficient means of enforcing fiduciary duties, especially within
the context of a bankruptcy case. The fact that the estate is insolvent
will usually mean that the trustee and his or her counsel will be ad-
verse to commencing litigation because there are no funds to pay
legal fees or disbursements. Moreover, it is unlikely that individual
unsecured creditors will have the financial incentives or inducements
to finance the litigation. Consequently, even with a less rigorous stan-
dard there are still significant impediments to the enforcement of fi-
duciary duties in corporate reorganization cases.
B. Creditors' Committee
In Chapter 11 the presumption is that the debtor's management
will remain in control and manage the debtor's affairs.3 2 Unsecured
creditors participate in a reorganization case principally through a
statutorily created device called a "creditors' committee."33 A credi-
29 703 F.2d 1339 (9th Cir. 1983).
30 Id. at 1357.
31 The Ninth Circuit stated:
Given that the term "surcharge" itself means to impose "personal liability on
a fiduciary for wilful or negligent misconduct in the administration of his
fiduciary duties," . . . we find this interpretation to be incorrect. Properly
construed, the language quoted from Mosser indicates merely that the sort of
personal liability which may be imposed on a trustee for the acts of his em-
ployees is not strict liability but rather liability depending at least on a show-
ing of the trustee's own negligence; Mosser does not "hold" in any sense that
personal liability does not obtain if such a showing of negligence is made.
Id. at 1357 n.26. (citation omitted).
32 See In re Tahkenitch Tree Farm Partnership, 156 B.R. 525, 527 (Bankr. E.D. La.
1993); In re Microwave Prods. of Am., Inc., 102 B.R. 666, 670 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn.
1989); In reSt. Louis Globe Democrat, Inc., 63 B.R. 131, 138 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1985).
33 See Kenneth N. Klee & K. John Shaffer, Creditors' Committees Under Chapter 11 of
the Bankruptcy Code, 44 S.C. L. REv. 995, 1000 (1993). The Code mandates the ap-
pointment of a creditors' committee in every case, and Code § 1102(a) (1) states:
Except as provided in paragraph (3), as soon as practicable after the order
for relief under chapter 11 of this title, the United States trustee shall ap-
I998]
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tors' committee is the entity that represents the unsecured creditors
in a corporate reorganization case, and it owes a fiduciary duty to the
unsecured creditors.3 4 Code § 1103(c)3 5 specifies the powers of a
creditors' committee, which include conducting an investigation of
the debtor's affairs and negotiating a consensual plan of reorganiza-
tion. Although some might deem the authority of a creditors' com-
mittee to be expansive, it lacks the authority to operate the estate.3 6
point a committee of creditors holding unsecured claims and may appoint
additional committees of creditors or of equity security holders as the
United States trustee deems appropriate.
11 U.S.C. § 1102(a) (1) (1994).
34 Members of a creditors' committee are fiduciaries for those whom they serve.
See In re Grant Broad., Inc., 71 B.R. 655, 661-62 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987); In re Mesta
Mach. Co., 67 B.R. 151, 156-57 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1986). A creditors' committee ful-
fills its fiduciary duties to its constituency by advising the creditors of their rights and
by advising the creditors of the proper course of action to pursue. See In re REA
Holding Corp., 8 B.R. 75, 81 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980). A primary goal of a creditors'
committee is to preserve the debtor's estate so as to either preserve or enhance the
distribution that unsecured creditors will receive. See In re Charter Co., 50 B.R. 57, 62
(Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1985).
35 Code § 1103(c) states:
A committee appointed under section 1102 of this title may-
(1) consult with the trustee or debtor in possession concerning the ad-
ministration of the case;
(2) investigate the acts, conduct, assets, liabilities, and financial condi-
tion of the debtor, the operation of the debtor's business and the desir-
ability of the continuance of such business, and any other matter
relevant to the case or to the formulation of a plan;
(3) participate in the formulation of a plan, advise those represented by
such committee of such committee's determinations as to any plan for-
mulated, and collect and file with the court acceptances or rejections of
a plan;
(4) request the appointment of a trustee or examiner under section
1104 of this title; and
(5) perform such other services as are in the interest of those
represented.
11 U.S.C. § 1103(c) (1994).
36 Although a creditors' committee may consult with a debtor-in-possession con-
cerning the administration of the case, a creditors' committee was not intended to
have day-to-day input concerning the debtor's business decisions. See In re Finley,
Kumble, Wagner, Heine, Underberg, Manley, Myerson & Casey, 85 B.R. 13, 17
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988); DAVID G. EPsTErN ET AL., BANKRuprcY §§ 10-13 (1993). An
example of a creditors' committee lack of authority to make day-to-day business deci-
sions for a debtor is reflected in In re Calvary Temple Evangelistic Ass'n, 47 B.R. 520
(Bankr. D. Minn. 1984). There, the bankruptcy court held that a creditors' commit-
tee lacked the authority to make a motion to sell some of the debtor's property free
and clear of liens. The court concluded that Code §§ 1109(b) and 1103(c) (5) failed
to grant a creditors' committee the authority to make business decisions on behalf of
[VOL. 73:2
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Consequently, the function of a creditors' committee in a corporate
reorganization case is advisory rather than supervisory.3 7
A creditors' committee might be unable to protect the interests
of its constituents for various reasons. A creditors' committee is not
appointed in every case, which weakens the effectiveness and utility of
this device.38 Some committee members might lack experience in
dealing with insolvent companies, and some members might lack so-
phistication concerning insolvency law.39 Even though a creditors'
committee has been appointed, it might be inactive, and thereby pro-
vide no protection for the unsecured creditors.40 The estate, more-
over, might be insolvent and lack the funds necessary to retain
the estate. In the same vein, in In re UNR Industries, Inc., 30 B.R. 609 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1983), the trade creditors' committee sought an order that would restrict the debtor's
ability to make certain business decisions. The court denied the trade committee's
request. The caselaw and the Code made it clear that Congress intended to allow
debtors-in-possession to manage their affairs without day-to-day input from creditors.
Moreover, if the trade creditors are dissatisfied with current management, then they
can seek the appointment of a trustee.
37 See4 DANIEL R. CowANs, CoywANs BANKRUPTcY LAw AND PRACTICE § 20.8 (1994);
EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 36, §§ 10-11.
38 Professor LoPucki has observed:
The Bankruptcy Code provides that "the court shall appoint a committee of
creditors holding unsecured claims." Based upon this provision, Congress
had naively predicted that "[t]here will be at least one committee in each
case." The Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Missouri, however,
appointed a creditors' committee in only 19 (40%) of the cases studied. The
trend over the year studied appeared to be away from the appointment of
committees. Committees were appointed in the first five cases under the
new Code. During the last four months of the year committees were ap-
pointed in only four of the eighteen cases filed (22%) and in only one of five
that were destined for success.
Lynn M. LoPucki, The Debtor in Full Control-Systems Failure Under Chapter 11 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code?, 57 AM. BANxR. Lj. 247, 250 (1983). The low percentage of cases in which
a creditors' committee is actually appointed weakens the protections offered to the
general creditor body by this mechanism.
39 See Peter C. Blain & David A. Erne, Creditors' Committees Under Chapter 11 of the
United States Bankruptcy Code: Creation, Composition, Powers and Duties, 67 MAR. L. REv.
491, 491-92 (1984). Professor Lo Pucki has written:
Second, the members of creditors' committees are seldom qualified for the
task they are asked to undertake. At least in the Western District of Missouri,
few have had any experience with reorganization proceedings and even
fewer are equipped by training or experience to evaluate the debtor's busi-
ness or negotiate a plan.
LoPucki, supra note 38 at 252.
40 See Jerome R. Kerkman, The Debtor in Full Control: A Case for Adoption of the
Trustee System, 70 MARQ. L. REv. 159, 183 (1987).
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committee counsel or to compel the counsel to act zealously.4 1 More
importantly, as previously discussed, there are structural impediments
that prevent creditors' committees from adequately protecting the in-
terests of its members in a corporate reorganization case when a
debtor is insolvent. The major premise of Code § 1103(c) is that a
creditors' committee's primary obligation is to negotiate a consensual
reorganization plan.42 There are three important assumptions in-
volved underlying this premise: 1) that current management should
remain in control of the debtor; 2) that the debtor is capable of suc-
cessfully reorganizing; and 3) that the creditors favor reorganization
rather than liquidation. In some reorganization cases, these assump-
tions might be incorrect and operate to the detriment of the un-
secured creditors. Code § 1103(c) fails to grant a creditors'
committee any authority concerning the day-to-day operations of the
debtor, the development of a business plan, or the debtor's restructur-
ing. A creditors' committee's inability to have any input concerning
the preceding matters not only places it in a powerless position, but
also places the unsecured creditors in a similar position concerning
the debtor's daily operations and the debtor's business plan. The es-
tate might not have the funds necessary to compensate creditors' com-
mittee counsel for litigation concerning the enforcement of fiduciary
duties. 43 Consequently, debtor's management is at liberty to proceed
41 See Blain & Erne, supra note 39, at 491-92; LoPucki, supra note 38, at 250.
42 See In re Finley, Kumble, Wagner, Heine, Underberg, Manley, Myerson &
Casey, 85 B.R. 13, 16-17 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988); Andrew DeNatale, The Creditors' Com-
mittee Under The Bankruptcy Code-A Primer, 55 Am. BANKR. L.J. 43, 53 (1981).
43 Under these circumstances, the only constraint upon the debtor is that some
transactions will have to be approved by the bankruptcy court. For example, sales
outside of the ordinary course of business require bankruptcy court approval. See 11
U.S.C. § 363(b) (1) (1994). But the unsecured creditors might not be adequately rep-
resented in these hearings because the estate might lack the resources to compensate
creditors' committee's counsel. Therefore, creditors' committee's counsel might be
adverse to vigorously representing the interests of the unsecured creditors. Absent
specific transactions which require court approval, a debtor-in-possession is at liberty
to operate and manage the business as it prefers. Thus management is at liberty to
advance the interests of the shareholders and of itself to the detriment of the un-
secured creditors.
Congress has failed to provide a creditors' committee with effective remedies to
enforce management's fiduciary duties to the unsecured creditors. Although some
might contend that a creditors' committee can enforce fiduciary duties through the
plan process, that might be deceptive. First, it ignores that a significant amount of
important activity can occur in a reorganization case without the input of a creditors'
committee. Equally significant, it assumes that a debtor will be in a position to proffer
a plan of reorganization. In addition, some might posit that a creditors' committee
has the option of converting or dismissing a case or seeking the appointment of a
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as it desires concerning the debtor's day-to-day management, the
debtor's business plan, and the debtor's restructuring, and thus ig-
nore the interests of the unsecured creditors.
C. The Appointment of a Trustee
The appointment of a trustee" is supposed to be a major creditor
protection device.45 Nevertheless, as the following discussion will
demonstrate, the appointment of a trustee is an illusory remedy be-
cause: 1) there are significant transaction costs in seeking the appoint-
ment of a trustee; 2) there is a high burden of proof needed to secure
the appointment of a trustee; and 3) courts are adverse to granting
motions to appoint a trustee.
There is a strong presumption that in a Chapter 11 case a debtor
should remain in control and in possession of its business.46 In a cor-
porate reorganization case the appointment of a trustee is an ex-
traordinary remedy.47 The party seeking the appointment of a trustee
in a Chapter 11 case bears the burden of demonstrating by clear and
trustee. The preceding remedies are illusory because they are seldom granted during
the initial phases of a corporate reorganization case. It is during the initial phases of
a reorganization case that creditors are vulnerable because this is the period when
losses are being accumulated. Indeed, by the time a court is willing to appoint a
trustee the damage has been done and it is impossible to resuscitate the debtor. See,
e.g., In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 113 B.R. 164 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990).
44 Code § 1104(a) states:
At any time after the commencement of the case but before confirmation of
a plan, on request of a party in interest or the United States trustee, and
after notice and a hearing, the court shall order the appointment of a
trustee-
(1) for cause, including fraud, dishonesty, incompetence, or gross mis-
management of the affairs of the debtor by current management, either
before or after the commencement of the case, or similar cause, but not
including the number of holders of securities of the debtor or the
amount of assets or liabilities of the debtor; or
(2) if such appointment is in the interests of creditors, any equity secur-
ity holders, and other interests of the estate, without regard to the
number of holders of securities of the debtor or the amount of assets or
liabilities of the debtor.
11 U.S.C. § 1104(a).
45 See In reV. Savino Oil & Heating Co., 99 B.R. 518, 525 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1989);
ANTHoNY MICHAEL SABINO, PRACTICAL GUIDE TO BANKRuPrcy 9.1 [3] [b] (1994); MAR-
TINJ. BIENENSTOCK, BANKRuPrcY REORGANIZATION 285 (1987).
46 See In re Tahkenitch Tree Farm Partnership, 156 B.R. 525, 527 (Bankr. E.D. La.
1993); In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 113 B.R. 164, 167 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990).
47 See In re Madison Management Group, Inc., 137 B.R. 275, 281 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1992); In re Microwave Prods. of Am., Inc., 102 B.R. 666, 670 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn.
1989).
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convincing evidence that the appointment of a trustee is necessary;48 a
high burden of proof.49 It is expected that there will be some form of
mismanagement in every Chapter 11 case,50 but mere mismanage-
ment is insufficient to justify the appointment of a trustee. 51
A case that exemplifies the ineffectualness of Code § 1104(a) as
currently devised is Committee of Dalkon Shield Claimants v. A.H. Robins
Co.52 There, the district court had found the debtor in civil contempt
for various violations of a court order, and it also found that the
debtor had taken action in violation of both the letter and the spirit of
the Code. The Committee of Dalkon Shield Claimants (the "Commit-
tee") made a motion for the appointment of a trustee, and the motion
was denied. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district
court,5 3 holding that the record was barren of mismanagement or
fraud, and thus, the appointment of a trustee was not warranted. 54
48 See In re Sharon Steel Corp., 871 F.2d 1217, 1226 (3rd Cir. 1989); In re PMH
Corp., 116 B.R. 644, 646 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1989).
49 A motion to appoint a trustee is one of the few instances in which a bankruptcy
court will employ clear and convincing evidence as the standard of proof. Even when
allegations of fraud are involved concerning the nondischargeability of a debt, the
burden of proof is a preponderance of the evidence. See Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S.
279 (1991). The employment of the clear and convincing standard places a movant
at a significant disadvantage.
50 Chief Judge Lifland has written:
The language of § 1104(a)(1) of the Code represents Congressional
recognition that some degree of mismanagement exists in virtually every in-
solvency case. The philosophy of chapter 11 is to give the debtor a "second
chance" and, consistent with such philosophy, current management should
be permitted to identify and correct its past mistakes.
In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 113 B.R. 164, 168 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990) (citations
omitted).
51 One court has stated:
One case... has attempted to define incompetency and gross mismanage-
ment. The court stated, "incompetency has its roots in mismanagement, re-
quiring a showing of a lack of business acumen and ability . . . Gross
mismanagement suggests some extreme ineptitude on the part of manage-
ment to the detriment of the organization. But it must rise above simple
mismanagement to achieve the level envisioned by the Code."
In re Colorado-Ute Elec. Ass'n, 120 B.R. 164, 174 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1990) (citations
omitted).
52 828 F.2d 239 (4th Cir. 1987).
53 Id. at 242.
54 The Fourth Circuit stated:
We find that a careful reading of the court's opinion reveals that the court
did not find cause to appoint a trustee within the meaning of Section
1104(a) (1). The court noted specifically that it had not found fraud or mis-
management. Further, it stated that the concepts of incompetence and dis-
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Equally significant, the court reasoned that Code § 1104(a) had to be
interpreted flexibly, and that a court had discretion to determine
whether conduct constituted incompetence or dishonesty for pur-
poses of § 1104(a). 55  A.H. Robins reflects the difficulties with
§ 1104(a) (1) because a bankruptcy court has an enormous amount of
discretion in determining whether conduct constitutes cause. Instead
of strictly construing the language of the Code, courts engage in a
cost-benefit analysis to determine whether the appointment of a
trustee will be beneficial. Decisions such as A.H. Robins undermine
the policy underlying Code § 1104(a), which is predicated upon credi-
tor protection and the enforcement of fiduciary duties.
Another consideration is that a motion to appoint a trustee in-
volves substantial transaction costs. There could be major discovery
taken by both parties, and a hearing could last for a few days. Unless
an unsecured creditor has obtained a sizable judgment, an individual
unsecured creditor might lack the financial incentive or resources to
seek the appointment of a trustee because the legal fees and costs
often make the motion cost prohibitive. Usually, it will be incumbent
honesty cover a wide spectrum of conduct and that the court has broad
discretion in applying such concepts to show cause. The court examined the
entire situation, including the consequences of appointing a trustee, and
determined that the debtor had not given the court cause to appoint a
trustee. The Committee misconstrues the court's statement regarding its
discretion, given in a finding of cause, to appoint a trustee. We believe that
the court's statement can only be construed to be a general assertion by the
court of its discretionary authority in the event, not present here, that it were
to find cause.
Id. at 241.
55 The court stated:
Like the district court, we recognize that Robins' conduct was improper and
warranted a civil contempt sanction. But a policy of flexibility pervades the
bankruptcy code with the ultimate aim of protecting creditors. A determina-
tion of cause, therefore, is within the discretion of the court and due consid-
eration must be given to the various interests involved in the bankruptcy
proceeding. "The concepts of incompetence, dishonesty, gross mismanage-
ment and even fraud all cover a wide range of conduct. . . . Implicit in a
finding of incompetence, dishonesty, etc., for purposes of section
1104(a) (1), is whether the conduct shown rises to a level sufficient to war-
rant the appointment of a trustee." Obviously, to require the appointment
of a trustee, regardless of the consequences, in the event of an act of dishon-
esty by the debtor, however slight or immaterial, could frustrate the purpose
of the Bankruptcy Act. Section 1104(a) (1), therefore, must be construed, if
possible, to make it harmonious with the Act in its entirety. Such construc-
tion requires that the courts be given discretionary authority to determine
whether conduct rises to the level of "cause."
Id. at 241-42 (citation omitted).
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upon the creditors' committee to make the motion to appoint a
trustee.5 6 The strong presumption against the appointment of a
trustee, and the transaction costs associated with a motion to direct
the appointment of a trustee, render Code § 1104(a) an inefficient
and ineffectual means of protecting creditors and enforcing fiduciary
duties in corporate reorganization cases.
D. A Motion Pursuant to Code Section 1112(b) to Dismiss or Convert
1. Bad Faith Dismissal
Code § 1112(b) authorizes a bankruptcy court for cause to dis-
miss a Chapter 11 case or convert a Chapter 11 case to Chapter 7.57 A
bankruptcy court will dismiss, at its inception, a Chapter 11 case if it
56 Robins was a mega case, and there were sufficient funds to finance litigation by
the Committee. But in some Chapter 11 cases involving an insolvent debtor, there
might not be sufficient funds to finance an aggressive litigation by a creditors'
committee.
57 Code § 1112(b) states:
Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, on request of a party in
interest or the United States trustee or bankruptcy administrator, and after
notice and a hearing, the court may convert a case under this chapter to a
case under chapter 7 of this tide or may dismiss a case under this chapter,
whichever is in the best interest of creditors and the estate, for cause, includ-
ing-
(1) continuing loss to or diminution of the estate and absence of a rea-
sonable likelihood of rehabilitation;
(2) inability to effectuate a plan;
(3) unreasonable delay by the debtor that is prejudicial to creditors;
(4) failure to propose a plan under section 1121 of this title within any
time fixed by the court;
(5) denial of confirmation of every proposed plan and denial of a re-
quest made for additional time for filing another plan or a modification
of a plan;
(6) revocation of an order of confirmation under section 1144 of this
titie, and denial of confirmation of another plan or a modified plan
under section 1129 of this title;
(7) inability to effectuate substantial consummation of a confirmed
plan;
(8) material default by the debtor with respect to a confirmed plan;
(9) termination of a plan by reason of the occurrence of a condition
specified in the plan; or
(10) nonpayment of any fees or charges required under chapter 123 of
title 28.
11 U.S.C. § 1112(b) (1994).
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establishes that the case was a bad faith filing.58 Bad faith corporate
reorganization cases are usually single asset cases, which usually in-
volve real property.59
Courts have developed criteria for determining whether a case is
a bad faith filing.60 However, the bad faith criteria are irrelevant to
unsecured creditors because they focus on the rights of secured credi-
tors and whether the filing of the case was intended to thwart their
rights to foreclose under nonbankruptcy law. As the bad faith criteria
reflect, bad faith cases are usually two-party disputes between a mort-
gagee and a debtor that do not involve unsecured creditors. There-
fore, the bad faith criteria are not a useful mechanism for protecting
unsecured creditors and enforcing fiduciary duties.
There are also other factors that make dismissal an unattractive
and ineffectual remedy. As previously discussed, there are transaction
costs, and an unsecured creditor might be unwilling to make a motion
to dismiss because the costs of making the motion will outweigh any
tangible benefit derived from prevailing on the motion.6 1 In addition,
the dismissal of the bankruptcy case might not be in the interests of
the unsecured creditors. The dismissal of the case would destroy any
possibility of an orderly liquidation of the estate, would destroy any
possibility of collective action by the unsecured creditors, would com-
pel unsecured creditors to commence litigation to obtain judgments,
and would compel unsecured creditors to incur more legal fees.
Moreover, dismissal is detrimental to the interests of the unsecured
58 See, e.g., In re Phoenix Piccadilly, Ltd., 849 F.2d 1393 (11th Cir. 1988); Pleasant
Pointe Apartments, Ltd. v. Kentucky Hous. Corp., 139 B.R. 828 (Bankr. W.D. Ky.
1992); In re Campus Hous. Developers, Inc., 124 B.R. 867 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1991).
59 See, e.g., In re Phoenix Land Corp., 164 B.R. 174 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1993); In re
Punta Gorda Assoc., 143 B.R. 281 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1992); In re Denver Inv. 141 B.R.
228 (Bankr. N.D. Fa. 1992).
60 Courts have employed the following factors:
1) the debtor has only one asset;
2) the debtor has few unsecured creditors whose claims are small in relation
to the claims of the secured creditors;
3) the debtor has few employees;
4) the real property is subject to a foreclosure proceeding;
5) the debtor's financial problems involve a two party dispute between it and
the secured creditor which can be resolved in state court; and
6) the timing of the filing of the petition evidences an effort by the debtor to
thwart the legitimate rights of the secured creditor.
In re Phoenix Piccadilly, at 1394-95.
61 The vast majority of bad faith dismissal motions are made by secured creditors
which are usually financial institutions. They can afford to make motions to dismiss
because they usually have significant amounts of money involved in these
transactions.
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creditors because a trustee would not be appointed to conduct an in-
vestigation and commence appropriate litigation. Thus, dismissing a
Chapter 11 case is contrary to the interests of the unsecured creditors.
2. Motion to Convert to Chapter 7
An unsecured creditor may also seek to have the Chapter 11 case
converted to Chapter 7.62 Although a motion to convert may appear
to be an attractive remedy, securing the granting of a motion to con-
vert to Chapter 7 during the initial stages of a Chapter 11 is difficult to
obtain.63 A case that exemplifies this is In re Rentclub, Inc.64 There,
within the debtor's exclusive period to file a reorganization plan,
Transamerica Rental Finance Corporation ("Transamerica") made a
motion to convert or dismiss. Transamerica alleged that the case
should be dismissed or converted because the debtor was unable to
effectuate a plan of reorganization. The debtor, within its exclusive
period, had filed a reorganization plan, and for two months had a
positive cash flow. The court denied the motion.65 The case was still
in its infancy, and the debtor should be granted an opportunity to
reorganize within a reasonable period of time.66
Rentclub reflects the problems that plague the current system.
The heavy emphasis on debtor protection and rehabilitation has sig-
nificant costs. Creditors are sometimes unjustly prevented from not
only exercising their Code remedies, but also nonbankruptcy entitle-
ments, and sometimes the unsecured creditors are involuntarily com-
pelled to subsidize a debtor's futile attempt to reorganize. The
62 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b) (1994).
63 See, e.g., In re Providence Television Ltd. Partnership, 75 B.R. 139 (Bankr. N.D.
Ill. 1987); In re Economy Cab & Tool Co., 44 B.R. 721 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1984).
64 141 B.R. 235 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1992).
65 Id. at 237.
66 The court stated:
The record clearly would support the proposition that the Debtor's pro-
jection for its economic survival is somewhat questionable, and its chance to
achieve reorganization under this Chapter is not without doubt. However,
this Chapter 11 case is still in its embryonic stage and the Debtor is proceed-
ing with due speed toward reorganization. Therefore, the Debtor should be
given a reasonable chance to conclude this Chapter 11 case without delay.
In light of the precarious economic condition of this Debtor, while this
Court is satisfied it should be given a short opportunity to achieve rehabilita-
tion, this Chapter 11 case is to be put on the fast track, and unless the
Debtor obtains confirmation of a Plan of Reorganization not later than Au-
gust 1, 1992, this Court will consider to revisit this Motion and enter such
Order as appears to be appropriate.
Id. at 236-37.
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inability to exercise important creditor remedies such as conversion
during the initial phases of a reorganization case is significant. It is
during the initial phases of the reorganization case that a debtor's
management makes important decisions concerning the business plan
and restructuring, and these decisions should be made to further the
interests of the unsecured creditors rather than solely to further the
interests of management or the equity security holders. An unsecured
creditor's inability to effectively utilize Code § 1112(b) during the ini-
tial phases of a reorganization limits an unsecured creditor's ability to
effectively enforce management's fiduciary duties. The threat of con-
version to Chapter 7 if management misbehaves is a powerful induce-
ment to compel management to act in the interests of the unsecured
creditors. 67 The threat of conversion is only effective if the creditors'
committee has the resources to make the motion, and bankruptcy
courts are inclined to grant these motions. The making and granting
of motions to convert will be a stimulus for the enforcement of fiduci-
ary duties by management and will make corporate reorganization
cases beneficial for unsecured creditors.
II. PROPOSED SOLUTION: VOTE OF No CONFIDENCE
A. Reform is Necessary
As the preceding discussion reflects, there are significant
problems with the creditor protection devices offered by the Code.
One of the major problems with the current creditor protection de-
vices is transaction costs. To utilize one of these remedies usually en-
tails a major expenditure, which individual unsecured creditors are
usually reluctant to expend.68 Not only does litigation require the
outlay of significant sums of money, but also, sometimes, a significant
67 In the same vein, it is during the initial phases of the reorganization that a
distribution for the creditors can be salvaged before a debtor accumulates major
losses and significant administrative expenses and the value of the estate is signifi-
cantly diminished. When some reorganization cases are finally converted to Chapter
7 pursuant to Code § 1112(b) (1), the debtor has failed to earn a profit and sustained
significant losses. See, e.g., In reExpress Freight Lines, Inc., 119 B.R. 1006 (Bankr. E.D.
Wis. 1990) (operating losses of $18,000 a month); In re Photo Promotion Assoc., 47
B.R. 454 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985) (the debtor sustained total monthly losses of
$2,000,000); In re CCN Realty Corp., 23 B.R. 261 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982) (failure to
collect rent and pay real property taxes led to diminution in value of the estate); In re
Pappas, 17 B.R- 662 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1982) (continuing erosion of the debtor's equity
because of unpaid property taxes and failure to service the secured debt).
68 The exception is ajudgment creditor who has obtained a large judgment, and
thereby, has an economic incentive to energetically seek the enforcement of its rights.
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investment of time.69 These are deterrents which prevent unsecured
creditors from exercising their rights, protecting their interests, and
enforcing the fiduciary duties owed to them by management. There-
fore, any proposed remedy should seek to reduce transaction costs,
make the enforcement of fiduciary duties in a bankruptcy case more
efficient, and make it unnecessary to resort to litigation to enforce
fiduciary duties.
Another problem associated with the creditor protection devices
is the enormous amount of discretion that bankruptcy courts have in
determining whether the creditor protection device will be utilized.
As the bankruptcy system is currently constructed, courts have enor-
mous discretion in adjudicating motions made pursuant to Code
§§ 1104(a) and 1112(b). The employment of this discretion can often
lead to incorrect and inconsistent decisions which are deleterious to
the interests of unsecured creditors. Another goal of a proposed rem-
edy should be to reduce a court's discretion, and thus, make the en-
forcement of a remedy a certainty.
Equally important, the current system is too debtor oriented.
The presumptions made in favor of debtor rehabilitation can lead to
exploitation of Chapter 11, and to non-enforcement of fiduciary du-
ties. Any reform should attempt to reach an equilibrium between
debtor rehabilitation and creditor protection, which will foster the en-
forcement of fiduciary duties.
B. The Vote of No Confidence
The Supreme Court in Commodity Futures Trading Commission v.
Weintraub,70 stated that the filing of a bankruptcy petition creates fun-
damental changes in the corporate relationships, and the interests of
the shareholders become subordinated to those of the creditors.
7
'
However, the Supreme Court failed to specify how bankruptcy should
alter those relationships and how those new relationships should be
enforced. In order to recognize and formalize the effect that the
commencement of a corporate reorganization case has on corporate
69 Unlike secured creditors, which are usually financial institutions that have a
significant amount of time and money invested in the transaction, unsecured credi-
tors may not have invested a significant amount of time or money into the transac-
tion. Consequently, unsecured creditors usually do not have the same incentives for
litigating as do secured creditors.
70 471 U.S. 343 (1985).
71 Id. at 355.
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relationships, a new mechanism called "A Vote of No Confidence"
should be adopted in insolvent corporate reorganization cases. 72
Under the Vote of No Confidence, if the debtor is insolvent, the
unsecured creditors would be granted the right to determine whether
current management should be displaced with a Chapter 11 trustee. 73
The vote would occur at the first § 341 meeting of creditors.74 At least
two weeks prior to the meeting, unless the court ordered otherwise,
unsecured creditors would be provided with copies of the petition, the
schedules, the statement of financial affairs, and any other documents
that the debtor desired to furnish to the unsecured creditors. The
debtor would be permitted to make a presentation concerning the
necessity to file for Chapter 11, its business plan and current opera-
tions, and its proposal concerning a disclosure statement and reorgan-
ization plan. The creditors would have the right to question, under
oath, the debtor and its accountant concerning the corporate reor-
ganization case. If a creditor desired, it could obtain a Federal Rule of
Bankruptcy Procedure 2004 examination of the debtor prior to the
§ 341 meeting.75 Moreover, creditors would have the opportunity to
72 In order to determine whether a debtor is insolvent, the definition of insol-
vency contained in Code § 101(32) would be employed. Therefore, if a debtor's lia-
bilities exceeded its assets, then it would be subject to a Vote of No Confidence.
73 The Vote of No Confidence would be inapplicable if the debtor were solvent.
Under these circumstances, the equity security holders still have an interest in the
corporation and their nonbankruptcy entitlements and contractual rights should be
enforced.
74 Code § 341(a) states:
Within a reasonable time after the order for relief in a case under this title,
the United States trustee shall convene and preside at a meeting of creditors.
11 U.S.C. § 341(a) (1994).
75 The pertinent portion of Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 2004 states:
(a) Examination on Motion. On motion of any party in interest, the court
may order the examination of any entity.
(b) Scope of Examination. The examination of an entity under this rule or
of the debtor under § 343 of the Code may relate only to the acts, conduct,
or property or the liabilities and financial condition of the debtor, or to any
matter which may affect the administration of the debtor's estate, or to the
debtor's right to a discharge. In a family farmer's debt adjustment case
under chapter 12, an individual's debt adjustment case under chapter 13, or
a reorganization case under chapter 11 of the Code, other than for the reor-
ganization of a railroad, the examination may also relate to the operation of
any business and the desirability of its continuance, the source of any money
or property acquired or to be acquired by the debtor for purposes of con-
summating a plan and the consideration given or offered therefor, and any
other matter relevant to the case or to the formulation of a plan.
(c) Compelling Attendance and Production of Documentary Evidence. The
attendance of an entity for examination and the production of documentary
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discuss and assess the debtor's plight and whether it is desirable to
permit current management to continue in control. The creditors
would vote to determine whether a trustee should be appointed, and
the rules governing the election of a trustee contained in Code § 702
would apply to a Vote of No Confidence.76
IV. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR rE VOTE OF No CONFIDENCE
A. Bankruptcy Theory
1. The Creditors' Bargain
The economic theorists known as either the "collectivists" or
"creditors' bargain theorists" view bankruptcy's primary goal as serv-
ing as an efficient debt collection procedure. 77 The creditors' bargain
is the centerpiece of these theories, and it posits that bankruptcy
should not alter a creditor's nonbankruptcy entitlements to achieve
purely distributional goals.78 The creditors' bargain is based on the
evidence may be compelled in the manner provided in Rule 9016 for the
attendance of witnesses at a hearing or trial.
FED. R. BAN KR. P. 2004(a)-(c).
76 The pertinent provisions of Code § 702 state:
(a) A creditor may vote for a candidate for trustee only if such creditor-
(1) holds an allowable, undisputed, fixed, liquidated, unsecured claim
of a kind entitled to distribution under section 726(a) (2), 726(a) (3),
726(a) (4), 752(a), 766(h), or 766(i) of this title;
(2) does not have an interest materially adverse, other than an equity
interest that is not substantial in relation to such creditor's interest as a
creditor, to the interest of creditors entitled to such distribution; and
(3) is not an insider.
(b) At the meeting of creditors held under section 341 of this tile, creditors
may elect one person to serve as trustee in the case if election of a trustee is
requested by creditors that may vote under subsection (a) of this section,
and that hold at least 20 percent in amount of the claims specified in subsec-
tion (a) (1) of this section that are held by creditors that may vote under
subsection (a) of this section.
(c) A candidate for trustee is elected trustee if
(1) creditors holding at least 20 percent in amount of the claims of a
kind specified in subsection (a) (1) of this section that are held by credi-
tors that may vote under subsection (a) of this section vote; and
(2) such candidate receives the votes of creditors holding a majority in
amount of claims specified in subsection (a) (1) of this section that are
held by creditors that vote for a trustee.
11 U.S.C. § 702 (a)-(c) (1994).
77 See Lawrence Ponoroff & F. Stephen Knippenberg, The Implied Good Faith Filing
Requirement: Sentinel of an Evolving Bankruptcy Policy, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 919, 948 (1991).
78 SeeJackson & Scott, supra note 1, at 156. It has been written:
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Supreme Court's decision in Butner v. United States,79 which held that
property interests in bankruptcy cases are determined by reference to
nonbankruptcy law.80
Bankruptcy is a response to the common pool problem that oc-
curs when a debtor's assets are insufficient to pay all of the creditors'
claims in full.8 ' In response to the common pool problem, bank-
ruptcy is supposed to be a collective proceeding that will maximize the
value of the estate and the distribution to creditors.8 2 Bankruptcy ac-
complishes this goal by preventing individualistic and opportunistic
behavior that would be detrimental to collective creditor action.8 3
Therefore, bankruptcy law stays individual creditor collection activity,
which could prematurely dismantle the estate and prevent the credi-
[I]n its role as a collective debt-collection device, bankruptcy law should not
create rights. Instead, it should act to ensure that the rights that exist are
vindicated to the extent possible. Only in this way can bankruptcy law mini-
mize the conversation costs of transferring an insolvent debtor's assets to its
creditors.
JACKSON, supra note 1, at 22.
79 440 U.S. 48 (1979).
80 The enforcement of nonbankruptcy entitlements in bankruptcy is vital for the
creditors' bargain. It has been observed:
First, unless the rules regulating bankruptcy access were perfectly drawn, the
recognition that bankruptcy provides a method of distributing entitlements
that differs from state law would create incentives that would motivate par-
ties to use the bankruptcy process strategically. Unsecured creditors and eq-
uity owners would opt for bankruptcy when their share of the bankruptcy
estate exceeded the value of their entitlements under state law. These ac-
tions would be undesirable whenever the expectation of a greater share
stemmed solely from the claimant's ability to use the bankruptcy process
strategically to delay liquidation. Secured creditors, on the other hand,
would prefer nonbankruptcy law if bankruptcy would force them to share
their state law entitlements. Furthermore, once the ex ante bargain is
struck, individual claimants would thereafter bargain in the shadow of both
nonbankruptcy and bankruptcy law, exploiting provisions unfavorable to the
opposing side as a means of obtaining a favorable readjustment of their bar-
gained-for entitlements. As parties maneuver strategically to obtain the most
favorable individual outcome, they generate unnecessary social costs, includ-
ing a costly enforcement structure and a narrowing of the distinctions
among different classes of claimants.
Jackson & Scott, supra note 1, at 161-62.
81 SeeJAcxsON, supra note 1, at 197.
82 SeeJackson & Scott, supra note 1 at 162-63.
83 Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H.Jackson, Corporate Reorganizations and the Treat-
ment of Diverse Ownership Interests: A Comment on Adequate Protection of Secured Creditors in
Bankruptcy, 51 U. CHI. L. REv. 97, 100 (1984).
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tors from collectively determining what is the best use for the assets of
the estate.84
The creditors' bargain theorists disdain traditional bankruptcy
theorists' conceptions of the purpose of a corporate reorganization
case.85 The traditionalists' notion, that it is beneficial that creditors
be compelled to support a struggling business while it attempts to re-
organize, is incorrect.86 The creditors' bargain theorists posit that the
84 See Karobkin, supra note 1, at 729-30.
85 Dean Baird has stated:
This view of bankruptcy law as a common pool problem treats corporate
reorganizations as simply a different kind of collective proceeding in which
rights are frozen and ownership interests reallocated according to nonban-
kruptcy entitlements. The more traditional view of corporate reorganiza-
tions is strikingly different. Under this view, reorganizations provide
breathing space for troubled enterprises. They do not exist to implement
the investors' bargain (more specifically, the effective exercise of their with-
drawal rights). Rather, they exist to prevent the creditors' individual (or
collective) interests from destroying a firm as a going concern by forcing it
to liquidate piecemeal, destroying both jobs and assets in the process. Bank-
ruptcy law, under this view, tries to ensure that a firm survives, quite apart
from whether the owners as a group want it to or not. The filing of bank-
ruptcy petition stays collection efforts of creditors to give a debtor an oppor-
tunity to recover from a "temporary cash-flow problem" or a cyclical
downturn in the economy. I have criticized elsewhere any justification of
bankruptcy law that gives any investor (or indeed anyone else) substantive
rights in bankruptcy that they did not have outside of bankruptcy. This ap-
proach to bankruptcy law frequently seems to assume that we are always bet-
ter off if a particular firm stays in business. It does not squarely face the
possibility that all interested parties might be better off as a group if the
firm's assets were put to a different use.
Baird, supra note 1, at 133-34.
86 It has been written:
We think that this view is, as a matter of bankruptcy policy, fundamen-
tally wrong. Fashioning remedies for all the harm a failing business may
bring is difficult and beyond the competence of a bankruptcy court. The
wider effects of the failure of a particular enterprise are not easy to assess. A
principal characteristic of a market economy is, after all, that some firms fail,
and postponing the inevitable or keeping marginal firms alive may do more
harm than good. Forcing investors to keep assets in a relatively unproduc-
tive enterprise may limit the freedom of the same or different investors to
use those assets in a different and more productive one. Keeping a firm in
one town from closing may have the indirect effect of keeping a new one in
a different town from opening. Moreover, limiting the ability of investors to
reclaim their assets may reduce their incentive to invest (rather than con-
sume) in the first instance. Instead of weighing those effects equally, a bank-
ruptcyjudge is likely to focus on the demonstrable harms of those who are
before him.
Baird & Jackson, supra note 83, at 102.
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principal justification for bankruptcy law is to provide incentives for
creditors to act collectively to maximize the distribution to the credi-
tor body.8 7
The Vote of No Confidence is consistent with the creditors' bar-
gain theory. The theory underlying the Vote of No Confidence is that
a corporate reorganization case should be managed to maximize the
welfare of the creditors. Creditors should not be compelled to subsi-
dize a moribund firm while it futilely attempts to reorganize because
such attempts are inefficient and contrary to their interests. The Vote
of No Confidence enables creditors to determine at the inception of a
reorganization case whether it is more prudent to wait to be paid
through a reorganization plan, or to liquidate and be paid
immediately.88
Central to the Vote of No Confidence are the concepts of finan-
cial and economic distress. A firm is in economic distress when its
operating revenues are less than its operating costs.8 9 Such a firm is
not viable and should be liquidated immediately.90 On the other
hand, a firm that is in financial distress has financial problems which
87 It has been stated:
A principal justification for bankruptcy law, then, is to provide incen-
tives for individual claimants such that each of them, as well as constituent
groups, finds it optimal either to wait or to collect immediately, depending
on the underlying empirical realities and on the interests of the claimants as
a whole. Whichever course the law encourages parties to take, maximizing
the total welfare of the group will necessarily be the central objective.
Jackson & Scott, supra note 1, at 160.
88 It has been stated:
Even after collective action begins, the choice between liquidation and
rehabilitation will often be difficult. If the going concern value of the firm
exceeds its liquidation value, then the debtor's claimants as a group would
prefer not to have the firm liquidated but rather would prefer to have the
business sold as a debt-free entity. Indeed, if the debtor's long-term pros-
pects were sufficiently bright, the claimants would prefer to delay collection
altogether and allow the debtor to recover. Going concern value does not
exceed liquidation value in all cases, however. The assumption of greater
going concern value depends upon the existence of two factors: the debtor's
assets must be worth more in combination than if they were broken up and
sold, and the long-term prospects of the debtor must be brighter than the
short-term prospects. In cases where either of these factors does not hold,
total group welfare would be enhanced by a prompt liquidation of the
debtor, as opposed to a collective proceeding in which some interests might
gain greater shares at the expense of others.
Id. at 159-60.
89 See Robert K. Rasmussen & David A. Skeel, Jr., The Economic Analysis of Corporate
Bankruptcy Law, 3 AM. BAuNm. IN ST. L. REv. 85, 87 (1995).
90 It has been stated:
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are primarily related to its capital structure;9 ' enterprises that are ex-
periencing financial distress are viable companies and should be
reorganized.92
One of the major problems with current corporate reorganiza-
tion law is that there is no self-executing mechanism that enables
creditors to determine whether a firm is experiencing economic or
financial distress, and thus, whether the firm is an economically viable
enterprise. Corporate reorganization law's failure to distinguish be-
tween economic and financial distress promotes abuse of Chapter 11,
and is detrimental to unsecured creditors. The Vote of No Confi-
dence confronts the issue of economic and financial distress in a man-
ner that promotes creditor welfare maximization because, at the
inception of the case, the unsecured creditors determine which
course of action will maximize their wealth. The concept of welfare
maximization is the mechanism that measures and enforces fiduciary
duties in a corporate reorganization case because the ultimate goal for
an unsecured creditor is to receive as great a distribution as possible.
In addition, by selecting to retain current management or to obtain
the appointment of a trustee, the unsecured creditors are selecting
fiduciaries whom they believe will act in their best interests, namely to
maximize their distributions. This acts to rectify one of the major
problems of the current system, agency costs, in which current man-
agement will futilely attempt to revive a moribund enterprise in the
hope of saving their employment and salvaging some value for the
equity security holders. The Vote of No Confidence ensures that
bankruptcy will be employed as an efficient debt collection procedure
which maximizes creditor welfare. Therefore, the Vote of No Confi-
dence is not only consistent with the creditors' bargain, but more im-
Such a firm should not continue in business. Its continued existence drains
the economy. Indeed, in some instances, allowing the firm to continue in
operation under the protection of the bankruptcy law may lead to wide-
spread losses in the industry in which it operates. From a societal point of
view, there is little justification in attempting to prop up firms which have
failed in the market place.
Id. at 87-88.
91 See id. at 88.
92 It has been written:
For example, when Johns-Manville, Federated Department Stores and Tex-
aco filed for bankruptcy protection, few if any thought that these firms
should be closed. They all were healthy firms in that their operating reve-
nues exceeded their operating costs. The problem was their capital struc-
ture. In all cases, through various means, the firms had incurred more debt
than they could pay off. They all were suffering from financial distress.
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portantly, it also effectuates the principles underlying the creditors'
bargain. 93
B. The Vote of No Confidence is an Efficient and Effectual Mechanism
for the Enforcement of Fiduciary Duties in Insolvent Corporate
Reorganization Cases
When an insolvent company files for Chapter 11, there are inher-
ent conflicts of interest among the different parties in interest.94 For
example, the equity security holders have interests that are different
from those of the unsecured and secured creditors. For instance, the
equity security holders would be likely to deem it in their best interests
if management pursues speculative ventures with a potential high rate
of return.95 They have little to lose and a lot to gain if such ventures
93 Creditors effectively own insolvent firms. See Kham & Nate's Shoes No. 2, Inc.
v. First Bank, 908 F.2d 1351, 1360 (7th Cir. 1990). Thus, once a firm files a corporate
reorganization case, its creditors should not be deemed a hostile outside force. See
Forum Group, Inc. v. Harrell (In re Forum Group, Inc.), 181 B.R. 379, 383 (Bankr.
S.D. Ind. 1995), affd, 82 F.3d 159 (7th Cir. 1996). The primary goal of a debtor-in-
possession is to get the creditors paid. See In re Pied Piper Casuals, Inc., 40 B.R. 723,
727 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984). The creditors' bargain theory makes a significant contri-
bution to bankruptcy policy because it posits that, regardless of whether a bankruptcy
case is in Chapter 7 or Chapter 11, the ultimate goal is maximization of creditor
wealth through maximizing the value of the estate. The Vote of No Confidence pro-
vides an efficient and effectual mechanism for the implementation of this policy be-
cause the unsecured creditors should be able to determine what is in their best
interests. The Vote of No Confidence is intended to prevent equity and management
from exploiting Chapter 11 to extract concessions from the creditors, and thus, un-
necessary wealth transfers between unsecured creditors and equity security holders.
94 It has been observed:
In our view, the fiduciary obligations of the DIP involve an inherent
conflict. The DIP has a bifurcated responsibility that runs jointly to credi-
tors, equity investors and other owners. This places the officers, directors
and managing partners in a conflicting position in all cases. Since the inter-
ests of the groups they owe obligations to are not always parallel, actions that
benefit one group may harm the others. Yet, by creating the debtor in pos-
session, Chapter 11 explicitly countenances this conflict.
Raymond T. Nimmer & Richard B. Feinberg, Chapter 11 Business Governance: Fiduciary
Duties, Business Judgment, Trustees and Exclusivity, 6 BANKR. DEV. J. 1, 2 (1989).
95 See Martin J. Bienenstock, Conflicts Between Management and the Debtor in Posses-
sion's Fiduciary Duties, 61 U. CN. L. Rxv. 543, 544-45 (1992); see also Christopher W.
Frost, Running the Asylum: Governance Problems in Bankruptcy Reorganizations, 34 ARiz. L.
REv. 89, 109-10 (1992) ("As the corporation approaches insolvency, shareholder-
creditor conflicts become more pronounced. Shareholders put less and less capital at
risk in each new business decision as the value of the corporation declines. Thus,
shareholders' appetite for risk in the use of assets can be expected to increase.").
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are successful. 96 On the other hand, the unsecured and secured cred-
itors will prefer business decisions that are more conservative and pre-
serve asset value.97 The preceding problems are exacerbated because
management in Chapter 11 cases is selected by the shareholders and
not the unsecured creditors. Under these circumstances, manage-
ment might not embark on a strategy that seeks to maximize or main-
tain asset value, but rather, they might engage in a strategy that
unjustifiably dissipates the value of the estate through increased risk
taking and deprives the unsecured creditors of receiving any distribu-
tion. This inherent conflict deprives bankruptcy of its utility for the
unsecured creditor because the equity security holders will seek to ex-
ploit the bankruptcy process to salvage their investment at the ex-
pense of the unsecured creditors. Under these circumstances,
bankruptcy is an inefficient debt collection device; instead, it is a pro-
cess under which equity security holders attempt to extinguish the
claims of unsecured creditors while attempting, in one form or an-
other, to rescue their nonexistent interests in the corporation.
Under the present structure of Chapter 11, management also suf-
fers from significant conflicts of interests.98 Management may prefer
to pursue a course of action that is contrary to the best interests of the
unsecured creditors.99 This reflects "agency costs" which are a major
96 See Edward S. Adams, Governance in Chapter 11 Reorganizations: Reducing Costs,
Improving Results, 73 B.U. L. REV. 581, 609-10 (1993); Bienenstock, supra note 95, at
544-45 (1992).
97 See Bienenstock, supra note 95, at 544-45 (1992).
98 One commentator has written:
The bankruptcy fiduciary duty points management in the direction of
acting in the interests of both creditors and shareholders. Management is
called upon to operate the business in accordance with this principle-maxi-
mizing the value of the assets of the reorganizing company while attempting
to sort out the conflicts among pre-bankruptcy owners in some reasoned
way. This role necessarily places management in a conflicting position in
making actual decisions. The interests of the various creditors and share-
holders almost always will be in conflict in the Chapter 11 process because
the process involves a zero sum game in which there will be winners and
losers.
Frost, supra note 95, at 118-19.
99 It has been stated:
While management owes fiduciary duties to creditors, management's con-
cerns with preserving or improving its positions with the reorganized debtor
can affect its negotiation of a Chapter 11 plan in several respects. First, man-
agement will not likely want to liquidate substantial assets during the Chap-
ter 11 case or as part of the Chapter 11 plan if the liquidation is not essential
to survival and will materially decrease the business to be managed after con-
firmation of a plan. Second, if two or more classes of creditors exist to nego-
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problem since management's interests are not necessarily aligned with
those of the unsecured creditors.100 Agency problems are exacer-
bated in insolvent corporate reorganization cases because manage-
ment is not selected by the unsecured creditors. The Vote of No
Confidence is intended to alleviate conflicts of interests and agency
costs. Unless management is amenable to implementing policies and
strategies that are beneficial to the unsecured creditors, it is highly
probable that management would lose a Vote of No Confidence. The
Vote of No Confidence is a mechanism that reduces the conflict of
interest problems and the "agency costs" in insolvent corporate reor-
ganization cases, thereby facilitating the enforcement of fiduciary
duties.
C. Equity Security Holders Have No Real Interest in an Insolvent
Corporation Because the Unsecured Creditors are the Real Parties
in Interest
In theory, when a debtor is insolvent the unsecured creditors are
the real parties in interest, and the debtor should be operated to fur-
ther the interests of the unsecured creditors.101 Indeed, the priority
provisions of the Code provide that creditors must be paid in full
prior to any junior class receiving any distribution under a reorganiza-
tion plan. 0 2 Thus, when a company is insolvent, management should
iate with, management may be more partial to the class that wants to retain
management on the best terms to operate the business of the reorganized
debtor. In both situations, management has a fiduciary duty to do what is
best for the estate and creditors, and has a potentially conflicting interest in
doing what is best for management.
Bienenstock, supra note 95, at 545-46.
100 Professor Ayer has written:
The first of these is the notion of "agency costs," otherwise known as the
problem of "other people's money"-an idea so pervasive in commerce that
at least two good works on commercial wrongdoing have chosen it as a title.
To the non-specialist, the agency problem is the elementary insight that in
any situation where there is both a principal and an agent, the agent will
have different motivations than the principal and will have an instinct to
"shirk" or similarly to degrade the management contract.
John D. Ayer, The Role of Finance Theory in Shaping Bankruptcy Policy, 3 AM. BANKR. INST.
L. REv. 53, 57 (1995).
101 The interests of shareholders are subordinated to those of the creditors in
bankruptcy. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343,
355 (1985). Creditors effectively own insolvent firms. See Kham & Nate's Shoes No. 2,
Inc. v. First Bank, 908 F.2d 1351, 1360 (7th Cir. 1990).
102 The absolute priority rule provides that a dissenting class of unsecured credi-
tors must be paid in full before a junior class is entitled to receive a distribution of
property under a reorganization plan. See Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485
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pursue strategies and policies which will enhance the welfare of the
unsecured creditors.10 3 The Vote of No Confidence enforces the
principles underlying the absolute priority rule and corporate fi-
nance. When a Chapter 11 debtor is insolvent the unsecured credi-
tors should be allowed to select management that will pursue their
interests, and not be beholden or subject to the control of the share-
holders because, quite simply, an equity security holder does not have
a financial interest in an insolvent corporation.
D. The Vote of No Confidence Will Have a Salutary Impact on the
Corporate Reorganization Process
The current Chapter 11 system permits the debtor to remain in
control in order to encourage financially troubled companies to seek
bankruptcy relief.104 The proposed Vote of No Confidence will still
U.S. 197, 202 (1988). The absolute priority rule has been codified at 11 U.S.C.
§ 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) (1994).
103 A prominent bankruptcy practitioner has stated:
This tension is exacerbated in those situations in which the debtor un-
equivocally is insolvent, with little hope of enhancing values to attain sol-
vency. Because the Bankruptcy Code provides that creditors have priority
over stockholders in the hierarchy of dividends and distributions of consid-
eration, the argument may be made that an insolvent debtor should pursue
actions that further the interests of creditors despite the potentially negative
effect on its stockholders. Because stockholders of an insolvent debtor are
entitled to no distribution under a plan of reorganization if the absolute
priority rule is applied, the argument may be made that stockholders of an
insolvent corporation in Chapter 11 have no pecuniary interest in the case
and should not have any standing to be heard to impede the progress of the
case.
Harvey R. Miller, Corporate Governance in Chapter 11: The Fiduciary Relationship Between
Directors and Stockholders of Solvent and Insolvent Corporations, 23 SETON HALL L. REV.
1467, 1490 (1993).
In Manville Corp. v. Equity Security Holders Committee, 801 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1986),
the Equity Committee was dissatisfied with the plan of reorganization that the Board
of Directors had negotiated, and it sought to have a shareholders' meeting so that the
Board of Directors could be displaced. The Second Circuit held that the Equity Com-
mittee was entitled to have a shareholders' meeting. Significantly, the court noted
that the result would be different if Manville were insolvent and stated: "We note that
if Manville were determined to be insolvent, so that the shareholders lacked equity in
the corporation, denial of the right to call a meeting would likely be proper, because
the shareholders would no longer be real parties in interest." Id. at 65 n.6.
104 One commentator has noted:
The Bankruptcy Code is substantially more "user friendly" than its pred-
ecessor, the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. Under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898,
corporations seeking to reorganize were required to demonstrate they were
insolvent or unable to pay their debts as they matured. Furthermore, once
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encourage financially distressed companies to seek Chapter 11 relief if
they have the ability to reorganize. The Vote of No Confidence will
compel a debtor and its counsel to earnestly assess whether the com-
pany is financially viable and can reorganize, and whether the com-
pany's problems are related to economic or financial distress. The
threat that the unsecured creditors might elect to appoint a trustee
will discourage economically distressed companies from exploiting
Chapter 11.
If a company is financially viable, then it should not be deterred
from seeking Chapter 11 relief. Management will have the opportu-
nity to explain to the creditors the problems that necessitated the fil-
ing of the reorganization case and management's proposals for
rectifying the debtor's financial problems. The unsecured creditors
will have an opportunity to evaluate management's presentation and
proposals, and make an informed decision concerning the debtor's
management. If the unsecured creditors can reasonably expect to re-
ceive a greater distribution if the debtor remains in business, then it is
probable that the unsecured creditors will vote to retain current man-
agement and permit the debtor sufficient time to reorganize.
The ability of the unsecured creditors to select management and
influence the policies and strategies that will be adopted by the debtor
should facilitate the enforcement of fiduciary duties. The Vote of No
Confidence compels a debtor's management to be receptive to the
needs and desires of the unsecured creditors from the inception of
the reorganization case which rectifies some of the problems with
Chapter 11. Equally important, the Vote of No Confidence can be
implemented without unsecured creditors incurring significant trans-
action costs. A self-executing mechanism will ensure that the Vote of
No Confidence will not be dependent upon whether a creditors' com-
mittee has been appointed, whether a sole unsecured creditor is will-
ing to absorb the legal fees and costs, or whether a bankruptcy court is
inclined to grant relief.
having filed for reorganization, managers of large publicly held corporations
were required to turn their operations over to trustees.
In drafting Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, Congress sought to
conserve corporate assets by directing managers of financially troubled com-
panies toward reorganization rather than liquidation. It accomplished this,
in part, by eliminating the threshold requirements for filing for reorganiza-
tion and by allowing corporate managers to retain control of the debtor af-
ter filing.
Anne M. Burr, The Unproposed Solution to Chapter 11 Reform: Assessing Management Re-
sponsibility for Business Failures, 25 CA. W. INT'L. LJ. 113, 113-14 (1994).
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Although some might contend that the Vote of No Confidence
will deter financially distressed companies from filing for Chapter 11,
the Vote of No Confidence should encourage financially troubled
companies to seek Chapter 11 relief earlier while the company can be
salvaged. The Vote of No Confidence is only applicable if a company
is insolvent as of the date of the filing of the petition; hence, as a
company nears insolvency it has an incentive to file for Chapter 11
relief before it is deemed insolvent. Under these circumstances, the
Vote of No Confidence encourages financially distressed companies
to seek Chapter 11 relief, and thus fosters debtor rehabilitation for
financially viable enterprises.
V. CONCLUSION
Although some might contend to the contrary, Chapter 11 is cur-
rently skewed in favor of debtors to the detriment of the unsecured
creditors. 10 5 Indeed, in Chapter 11 cases unsecured creditors are
placed in an untenable position because it is difficult, if not impossi-
ble, for them to enforce the fiduciary duties owed to them by debtors-
in-possession. The proposed concept of the Vote of No Confidence is
a self-executing mechanism to ensure that the unsecured creditors are
granted a voice in the operation of the debtor. One of the merits of
the "Vote of No Confidence Proposal" is that it will not require a ma-
jor overhaul of the Code, and therefore, will be simple to enact and
effect. The implementation of the Vote of No Confidence will effec-
tively correct the imbalances in the current system and thereby trans-
form Chapter 11 into an efficient vehicle for maximizing distribution
to creditors, which is the ultimate fulfillment of fiduciary duties owed
to the unsecured creditors and the enforcement of the creditors'
bargain. 10 6
105 One commentator has suggested:
Despite the seemingly broad powers of the DIP, several sources prohibit
absolute discretion. There are five important restrictions on the power of
the debtor in possession. They include the power of the court to limit the
discretion of the debtor in possession; the ability of the creditors' committee
to monitor the DIP; the potential for the conversion of the case from Chap-
ter 11 to Chapter 7; the possibility of the appointment of an examiner or
trustee; and the potential for the court to order the DIP to cease business
operations.
John T. Roache, Note, The Fiduciary Obligations of a Debtor in Possession, 1993 U. Ill. L.
Rev. 133, 142. As previously discussed, these alleged restraints are inefficient and
nonexistent such that the fiduciary obligations of a debtor-in-possession are mythical.
106 It has been written:
[VOL- 73:2
MYTH OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES
In the opinion of these authors, although there are indisputably certain
drawbacks in seeking the appointment of a trustee, where warranted, the
advantages far outweigh the disadvantages and make the motion to appoint
a trustee a powerful tool for the protection of creditors' rights. In the pro-
saic words of Bankruptcy Judge King in In re Hotel Associates, Inc. "[t]he
trustee will seek to benefit all the creditors and will bring a refreshing air of
objectivity and impartiality to a business .... " More specifically, the trustee
will hopefully keep accurate and trustworthy records, attempt to cooperate
with creditors in the pursuit of a plan, and provide invaluable intangible
support for the reorganization potentiality of the debtor. Moreover, the
trustee's objective management of the business may make it possible to sever
uneconomical loyalties to favored suppliers, customers or employees, sell off
or abandon unprofitable or marginal divisions or product lines, reduce over-
head by cutting out inefficiencies, waste and excess, and otherwise instill the
confidence of the creditors, equity security holders, and the bankruptcy
judge who appointed the trustee.
RobertJ. Berdan & Bruce G. Arnold, Displacing theDebtor in Possession: The Requisitesfor
and Advantages of the Appointment of a Trustee in Chapter 11 Proceedings, 67 MARO. L. REv.
457, 485-87 (1984).
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